Outward FDI from a Free Trade Area: the Small Open Economy Case by Yu-Ter Wang
Outward FDI from a Free Trade Area: the Small Open
Economy Case 
Yu-Ter Wang
Department of Economics, Ming Chuan University
Abstract
In a simple three-country model where two countries sign a free trade agreement eliminating
restrictions on trade and investment between them, this paper shows that any benefits
accruing to the investing country from engaging in outward FDI will depend on the
difference between the net return from investing in the third country and the equilibrium
return on investment between the two signatories, as well as the direction of the initial capital
flow between the signatories. Furthermore, the spillover effect created by the outward FDI
may benefit the other signatory that initially owns some of the capital stock of its counterpart.
Citation: Wang, Yu-Ter, (2008) "Outward FDI from a Free Trade Area: the Small Open Economy Case." Economics
Bulletin, Vol. 6, No. 47 pp. 1-7
Submitted: September 27, 2008.  Accepted: November 17, 2008.
URL: http://economicsbulletin.vanderbilt.edu/2008/volume6/EB-08F10027A.pdfOutward FDI from a Free Trade Area: the Small 
Open Economy Case 
Yu-Ter Wang* 
Department of Economics 
Ming Chuan University, Taiwan 
Abstract 
In a simple three-country model where two countries sign a free trade agreement 
eliminating restrictions on trade and investment between them, this paper shows that 
any benefits accruing to the investing country from engaging in outward FDI will 
depend on the difference between the net return from investing in the third country 
and the equilibrium return on investment between the two signatories, as well as the 
direction of the initial capital flow between the signatories. Furthermore, the spillover 
effect created by the outward FDI may benefit the other signatory that initially owns 
some of the capital stock of its counterpart.   
Keywords: Outward FDI; Free Trade Agreement 
JEL classification: F15; F21   
* Address for correspondence: Professor Yu-Ter Wang, Department of Economics, 
Ming Chuan University, 5 De Ming Rd., Gui Shan District, Taoyuan County 333, 
Taiwan. Email: ytwang@mcu.edu.tw. 
  11. Introduction 
 Regional economic integration has flourished throughout the world in recent 
years, perhaps due to the slow and difficult process of integration through the WTO. 
Most countries, regardless of the extent of their economic development, have signed 
regional trade agreements to become more economically integrated with other 
countries. Several hundred free trade agreements have been signed in recent decades. 
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) signed by the US, Canada and 
Mexico and the Asian Free Trade Area (AFTA) encompassing 10 South East Asian 
countries are famous examples of such agreements. 
For various reasons, a few member countries of regional trade blocs have 
engaged in outward foreign direct investment (FDI) in nonmember countries, as 
evidenced by the outward FDI engaged in by the US in China and the UK and by 
Singapore in the Netherlands and Taiwan. A significant number of studies have paid 
attention to the issues related to FDI (e.g., Brecher and Findlay (1983), Bhagwati et al. 
(1992), Markusen and Venables (1999), Baldwin et al. (2005), Wagner (2006), and 
Greenaway and Kneller (2007), etc.). Moreover, there are also some papers that have 
investigated the FDI engaged in by nonmember countries in the trade blocs, as well as 
the capital flows among bloc members (e.g., Miyagiwa and Young (1986), Wooton 
(1988), Webb (1990), Wang and Tsai (1996), Stevens (1998), Gao (2005), Buch et al. 
(2006), and Altomonte (2007), etc.). However, the effects of outward FDI from bloc 
members have been ignored in these earlier studies. 
This paper examines some important economic effects of the outward FDI in a 
third country engaged in by one of the signatories to a free trade agreement where all 
barriers to trade and investment between signatories are abolished, while those 
barriers between the signatories and the rest of the world remain. It is shown that the 
outward FDI could benefit the other signatory who initially owns some of the capital 
stock of its counterpart. Furthermore, this paper identifies the important factors 
determining whether the signatory will benefit from the outward FDI. These include 
the difference between the net return obtained from investing in the third country and 
the equilibrium investment return between the signatories, as well as the direction of 
the initial capital flow between the signatories.   
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the 
approach together with the model setting adopted. The related effects of the outward 
FDI engaged in a third country by a signatory to a free trade agreement are analyzed 
in Section 3. The conclusion is provided in Section 4. 
  22. The Basic Framework 
The approach adopted in this paper was pioneered by Dixit and Norman (1980). 
Three countries, A, B, and C, and two goods, 1 and 2, are taken into account in the 
model. The three countries are price takers in the world market. Countries A and B 
sign a free trade agreement in which all barriers to trade and investment between 
countries  A and B are removed completely, while those barriers between the two 
countries and the rest of the world are maintained. Good 1 is produced by using 
capital and labor and good 2 by using land and labor with production technology 
exhibiting constant returns to scale. Country A exports good 1 to partner B  and 
imports good 2 from partner B. 
Free capital movements are only allowed between partners A and B. The initial 
total capital flow from country A to country B is referred to as    that can be 
positive or negative. The outward FDI from country A into nonmember country C 
must be approved by the government of country C and the initial total outward FDI of 
country  A approved is denoted by 
AB k
.
AC k   The capital stock owned by country 
 is  denoted  by    Accordingly, the respective capital stocks in each of 
the three countries are 
) , , ( C B A j = .
j κ
,
AC AB A − κ
A k k k − = ,
AB B B k k + = κ  and  .
AC C C k = k + κ  
Define 
j r  as country j’s revenue from producing goods 1 and 2 , which is 
simply denoted as a function of the capital stock of country j. The subscript denotes 
partial differentiation in the analysis that follows. Thus,   is the return on 
investment obtained by investing in country 
j
k r
. j  Because of the complete capital 
mobility between countries A and B, the two countries’ returns on investment are 
equal in equilibrium, i.e.,   
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Next,   is defined as the expenditure incurred by country j to achieve national 
welfare    and is simply denoted as a function of the national welfare. In the model, 
total expenditure for each country equals the revenue from producing goods and the 
total return on investment, i.e.,   
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This paper will analyze the related effects of the outward FDI engaged in by signatory 
  3A using the model in the next section.
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3. Outward FDI Induced by a Higher Return 
This section will discuss the related effect of some outward FDI,  ), 0 (>
AC k d  
applied for by country A to country C and approved by country C, which is induced 
by a higher return on investment in country C (i.e.,  . Because of the 
diminishing returns on investment (i.e., 
2
)
FTA C i r > k
), 0 <
j
kk r  the capital outflow from country A 
to country C causes the return on investment of country A to rise above that of country 
B, and results in the movement of capital from country B to country A. Consequently, 
the capital stock of the two countries is lowered, and is captured by the following 
equation:  
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k d dk dk ) 2 1 ( = =  if the effect on both countries’ return on investment of a 
capital outflow is the same (i.e.,  ).  
Now, let us turn to the effect of the outward FDI on investing country A’s 
national welfare. Totally differentiating Eq. (2) and using Eq. (5) gives:   
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Eq. (6) tells us that country A becomes either better off or worse off investing in 
country C, depending on the following two factors: (i) the difference between the net 
return on investment obtained from investing in country C and the equilibrium return 
in the bloc and (ii) the direction of the initial capital flow between countries A and B. 
For a more detailed understanding of the two factors mentioned above, let us 
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k r r k k k r r η  as the investment return elasticity 
of country C and 
C AC k k s =
                                                
 as the share of country A’s total direct investment in 
the capital stock of country C. The net return on investment obtained as a result of 
 
1  It is noted that consideration of the trade between the free trade area and country C only complicates 
the model without affecting the conclusion and the analysis of the investment made by country B in 
country C, which can easily be derived from the paper, is similar to that of the investment made by 
country A in country C. These two pieces of information are provided for interested readers. 
2 Denote  as the world price of good   as land used in the production of good 2 in country j 
and    as labor employed in the production of good i in country j. The production functions of goods 
1 and 2 in country j are   and    respectively. Thus, country j’s revenue 
function can be expressed as  where    is the total labor 
in country j. The assumption that    is concave gives rise to the property that    
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  4country A investing in country C can be expressed as   
. 1 ) ( 0 ) ( ) 1 ( s r s r k r
C C AC C > < ⇔ < > − = + η η k kk k                         ( 7 )  
In Eq. (7), it is seen that the smaller   and  s η  are, the more likely it is that the net 
return on investment will be positive. Therefore, the net return on investment obtained 
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Next, the outward FDI from country A to country C pushes up the returns on 
investment of countries A and B, leading to a rise in the total return on investment 
obtained from the initial total capital flow between countries A and B. As a result, the 
investment by country A in country C causes country A to obtain more benefits from 
the initial total investment in country B if the direction of the initial capital flow 
between the two signatories is from country A  to country B (i.e.,  ). By 
contrast, country A obtains less benefits from the outward FDI in the case where 
. In particular, if   the second term in the right-hand side of Eq. (6) 
and the effect disappear. 
0 >
AB k
From the above analysis, the investment return elasticity of country C plays a 
key role in estimating the benefits obtained by country A from investing in country C. 
In particular, an investment return elasticity that is sufficiently low becomes the 
necessary condition for investing country A to benefit from the capital outflow when 
the direction of the initial capital flow between the two signatories is from country B 
to country A. 
However, if there is no investment by country A  in country C initially (i.e., 
0 =
AC k 0 ), then  = s
C
k r
. 0 ) , ( 0 ) , ( = > < ⇔ = < > − =
AB B B
kk
AB B B k dk r k d e ω ω
 and the net return on investment turns out to be  . In this 
case, for country A to be better off by investing in country C, the difference in the 
total return obtained between investing in country C and the bloc must be large 
enough to compensate for the possible loss from the total return on investment of the 
initial capital flow between countries A and B. 
For country B, whether or not the outward FDI engaged in by country A in 
country C gives rise to a beneficial spillover effect will depend on the direction of the 
initial capital flow between countries A and B. Country B is made better off (worse off) 
by the outward direct investment of country A when the direction of the initial capital 
flow is from country B (A) to country A (B). Additionally, the outward FDI will not 
affect country B’s welfare if country B has never invested in country A before. By 
totally differentiating Eq. (3), the result stated above can be obtained: 
                      ( 8 )  
We also can understand the effect of the outward FDI on the national welfare of 
  5nonmember country C by totally differentiating Eq. (4): 
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which means that if country A has invested in country C before, the total return on A’s 
investment paid for by country C is lowered because the capital inflow from country 
A reduces the return on investment in country C. However, country C’s welfare is 
independent of the capital flow without the initial direct investment from country A 
approved by country C.   
Finally, adding Eqs. (6), (8) and (9) together gives 
. 0 ) ( > − = + +
AC FTA C
k
C C B B A A k d i r d e d e d e ω ω ω ω ω ω                         ( 1 0 )  
That is, if everything else remains the same, the outward FDI from a signatory to the 
free trade agreement to a third country will be beneficial to the world in the case 
where the return on investment in the nonmember country is higher than that in the 
free trade area.   
4. Conclusion 
From the viewpoint of a nation as a whole, this paper uses a simple model to 
show that the benefits accruing to a country that signs a free trade agreement with 
another country from investing in a third country because of a higher return depend on 
the difference between the net return from investing in the third country and the 
equilibrium investment return between the two signatories to the agreement, as well 
as the direction of the initial capital flow between the two signatories. This paper also 
shows that a spillover effect is indeed created by the outward FDI, but whether or not 
this effect will benefit the other signatory also depends on the direction of the initial 
capital flow between the two signatories. In addition, the world will benefit from the 
increase in resource efficiency arising from the capital mobility.   
It can also be derived from the results of this paper that if the third country is a 
member of another regional trade bloc with perfect capital mobility among members, 
e.g., the UK in the European Union (EU), the outward FDI will also cause the capital 
of the third country to flow into the other members of the bloc, and will hence give 
rise to a benefit or a loss for the other members (i.e., another spillover effect).     
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